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Politics of Nonenforcement
Zachary S. Price†
Abstract
Constitutional controversies over executive nonenforcement have
emerged as a major theme of the Obama Presidency. Yet similar
controversies arose in other recent administrations—and in past
debates, the two political parties’ positions on this issue were often
reversed. Building on previous work addressing constitutional principles
that properly govern executive enforcement discretion, this brief
symposium contribution reflects on these principles in light of our
current, highly polarized politics. It does so in three ways. First, Part I
provides historical perspective on current debates by describing major
enforcement-related controversies from the Reagan and George W.
Bush Administrations. Second, Part II proposes criteria for assessing
how faithful an agency’s enforcement policy is to the agency’s
underlying statutory mandate. As Part II explains, several qualities—
most importantly, transparency and clarity—that are generally
considered virtues in administrative law are often counterproductive in
the enforcement context. Finally, Part III tentatively explores possible
practical, political implications of weakening norms of executive
enforcement obligation.
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Constitutional controversies over executive authority to decline
enforcement of federal laws have emerged as a major theme of the
Obama Presidency. The current administration has caused controversy
with nonenforcement policies relating to marijuana, implementation of
the Affordable Care Act, and immigration.1 Congressional Republicans
seized on the issue as a means to attack a President whose policies they
adamantly oppose.2 One rather ironic result is a lawsuit by the House
of Representatives to compel enforcement of provisions in a statute (the
Affordable Care Act) that House leaders denounce in the same breath
as unconstitutional and even un-American.3 On immigration,
Republican legislators have undertaken efforts to strip executive
authority or leverage congressional appropriations power to induce
executive changes.4
Newcomers to separation-of-powers controversy might be surprised
that in other recent administrations the two political parties’ positions
on this very issue were reversed. As one component of a broader deregulatory effort, officials in the Reagan Administration dramatically reduced enforcement of legal requirements that they considered bad
policy.5 At the same time, executive branch lawyers and allied scholars
advanced legal theories—now partially reflected in Supreme Court case
law6—to insulate such executive inaction from judicial reversal, based
in part on a claimed inherent executive authority of enforcement discretion.7 The two Bush administrations continued this pattern; if anything, the George W. Bush Administration pursued a more determined

1.

For discussion of these policies, see infra Part I.C.

2.

Id.

3.

See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, Case No. 14-cv-01967
(D.D.C., compl. filed Nov. 21, 2014); H.R. Res. 676, 113th Cong. (as
passed by House, July 30, 2014) (authorizing lawsuit); John Boehner &
Mitch McConnell, Now We Can Get Congress Going, Wall St. J., Nov.
5, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-boehner-and-mitch-mcconnell
-now-we-can-getcongress-going-1415232759 (calling the ACA “a hopelessly flawed law that Americans have never supported” and announcing
Republican leaders’ renewed “commitment to repeal ObamaCare, which
is hurting the job market along with Americans’ health care”).

4.

See, e.g., Preventing Executive Overreach on Immigration Act of 2014,
H.R. 5759, 113th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 4, 2014) (proposed
legislation to limit executive immigration relief).

5.

See infra Part I.A.

6.

See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 827–35 (1985) (holding that agency
enforcement decisions are generally unreviewable under the APA).

7.

See infra Part I.A.
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agenda of “deregulation through non-enforcement.”8 Then, as now,
critics in Congress howled in protest, decrying executive actions as
inconsistent with executive responsibility.9
In this brief symposium contribution, I highlight this historical
counterpoint as a vehicle for reflection on appropriate norms of
executive conduct. Given intense political polarization and partisan
disagreement over policy, selecting norms of executive obligation with
respect to law enforcement requires stepping behind a veil of ignorance
with respect to whether one’s own party will control Congress or the
executive branch. The current political reality of divided government,
intense partisan hostility, and legislative gridlock places pressure on the
executive branch to address popular demands through executive action.
At the same time, the scope and severity of existing laws, coupled with
political contestation over the policy merits of many past statutes, has
made nonenforcement a potentially significant form of executive action.
Yet parallels between current and past examples demonstrate how
forms of executive power claimed in one administration may be
deployed to quite different policy ends during a future presidency.
While this practical reality should give pause to both sides, it also demonstrates that any objective theory of executive power should seek foundations beyond the politics of the moment.
In previous work, I have addressed constitutional principles governing executive enforcement discretion.10 The constitutional structure
properly implies a default rule of limited executive enforcement discretion, most centrally because the Take Care Clause of Article II imposes
a duty on the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”11 While resource constraints on enforcement make more
expansive discretion inevitable in many areas of modern regulation, the
Constitution nonetheless supports a basic executive obligation to
effectuate statutory policies rather than deliberately subverting them
through nonenforcement.
Without repeating my full constitutional argument, I add to it here
in three ways. First, in Part I, I provide context for current debates by
offering a brief (and fairly unsystematic) historical account of
enforcement-related controversies from the Reagan, George W. Bush,
and Obama Administrations. I focus on these three administrations
because
significant
political
controversies
over
executive
nonenforcement arose during all of them and because the Reagan and
Bush examples provide useful counterpoints to current debates
8.

Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 795, 796 (2010). For discussion of examples, see infra
Part I.B.

9.

See infra Parts I.A–B.

10.

See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
Vand. L. Rev. 671, 673 (2014).

11.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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regarding the Obama Administration’s policies. Officials in the Reagan
and Bush Administrations reduced enforcement in key areas of concern
to their core constituents, including environmental, labor, and civil
rights regulation. In several areas of core concern to his own
constituents, President Obama has continued this pattern yet has done
so (at least in the most controversial cases) through more overt and
deliberate policies than his predecessors.
In Part II, I draw from these recent examples from ideologically
disparate administrations to propose criteria of faithful execution.
Assuming, as I have argued, that executive agencies are duty-bound to
enforce statutory policies, how might we assess their performance in
doing so? In areas of regulation where resource constraints necessitate
vast discretion, agencies must choose between a wide range of possible
enforcement practices and policies. The degree to which those practices
and policies accord with underlying statutory requirements will often
be more a matter of mindset and degree than any sort of bright-line
legal determination.12 Some criteria may nevertheless be identified, yet
those criteria often run counter to conventional intuitions about best
practices in other areas of administrative law. In particular, apart from
the obvious measures of overall intensity of effort and success in
inducing compliance, criteria of transparency, clarity, and central
direction may be relevant—but often as vices rather than virtues. In
the enforcement context, transparency enables evasion, clarity risks
shifting the effective rule of law from the statute itself to the
enforcement policy, and central direction invites political pressure on
more neutral agency judgments. Thus, although some have advocated
more transparent, definite, and centrally directed policies as a means of
assuring greater public accountability, such policies may at times
undermine the very value of agency fidelity to statutory requirements
that administrative law generally seeks to maximize.
In Part III, having framed possible criteria for faithful execution, I
raise the question of how strong or weak the norm of executive
enforcement responsibility should be. Building on my earlier, more formal analysis of this question, I speculate here about practical, political
consequences of eroding enforcement norms. In particular, I tentatively
propose three possible reasons to prefer a strong norm of executive
enforcement obligation. First, the durability of legislative achievements
often depends on enforcement by future administrations with different
policy preferences. Any further weakening of executive enforcement
obligations may thus imperil important legislative victories for both
sides. Second, to the extent Congress perceives executive policies as
unexpected or illegitimate, broadened executive nonenforcement could
heighten interbranch tensions and exacerbate political gridlock. Third,
although the political dynamics surrounding each particular law may
vary, in general extensive executive nonenforcement may weaken
12.

See Price, supra note 10, at 677, 755.
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political pressures on Congress to conform laws to current public
preferences. As recent examples illustrate, such executive action may
provide an outlet for short-term political demands for change. Yet doing
so may weaken the pressure on Congress to undertake more fundamental, long-term legal change. Insofar as that is true, maintaining a
strong sense of the executive obligation to enforce laws, whether or not
the President agrees with them, not only is more consistent with the
formal constitutional structure but also might stand the best chance of
giving us a sensible, responsive set of laws in the long run.

I.

Nonenforcement, Republican and Democrat

The Constitution, of course, divides legislative and executive power.
As the legislative branch of the federal government, Congress holds
lawmaking power (subject to the President’s limited veto power).13 The
President, as head of the executive branch, bears responsibility for
executing acts of Congress, a responsibility reflected most directly in
the President’s textually assigned duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”14 With respect to statutory enforcement, this
division of responsibility means that Congress passes general laws that
the executive branch enforces in particular cases subject to applicable
requirements of judicial or administrative due process.15
The separation of lawmaking and law-enforcing powers is a
deliberate feature of the constitutional design. Indeed, the framers
considered it an important protection for individual liberty.16 Yet this
division of responsibility can give rise to friction, as members of
Congress may feel the executive branch is dragging its feet in enforcing
laws that Congress has adopted. The problem seems particularly
pronounced in the post–New Deal (and particularly postwar) period.
The scale of modern federal administration combined with resource
constraints on enforcement of the many statutes Congress has passed
over time makes extensive enforcement discretion a practical necessity

13.

U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 7–8.

14.

Id. art. II, § 3.

15.

Modern administrative agencies, of course, combine functions of
lawmaking and law enforcement, but in principle a parallel division
between regulatory policy and enforcement of that policy obtains even in
the agency context. In any event, I concentrate here on the paradigm case
of executive enforcement of statutory requirements.

16.

See, e.g., The Federalist No. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (quoting Baron De Montesquieu) (“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body . . .
there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a
tyrannical manner.”).
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within the executive branch. One consequence is potential controversy
over the exercise of that discretion.17
Such friction may arise from differences between the constituencies
that elect Congress and the President. Again, this source of friction is
a deliberate feature of the constitutional structure. By design, Congress
includes geographically distributed representation—two senators from
each state in the Senate and representatives from specific geographic
districts, allocated by state, in the House of Representatives.18 In
contrast, the Electoral College selects the President. Although the Constitution also allocates electors by state,19 in practice the President
holds a more broadly national constituency. At present, many believe
the national political landscape favors Democrats in presidential races,
while the residential sorting of voters by party may (at least in
combination with existing districting arrangements) give Republicans
a natural advantage in the House of Representatives, if not also the
Senate.20 This divergence, moreover, appears particularly pronounced
in midterm elections, when core Democratic constituencies have tended
to turn out in lower numbers.21 In the recent past, however, these
relative advantages were reversed. Democrats controlled the House
throughout the Reagan and George H.W. Bush presidencies; they
controlled the Senate as well for roughly six of those twelve years.22
17.

For my elaboration of this historical argument, see Price, supra note 10,
at 742–46. Relatedly, Sean Farhang argues that interbranch conflict and
the “fragmented state structures” of the American polity have encouraged
Congress to rely on private rather than public enforcement of statutory
policies. Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation
and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. 5 (2010). I focus here on conflicts
over public enforcement policy rather than the choice between public and
private enforcement.

18.

U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2–3; Id. amend. XVII; 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2012).

19.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; 3 U.S.C. §§ 1–21 (2012).

20.

See Aaron Blake, People Move to Places that Fit Their Politics. And It’s
Helping Republicans, Wash. Post, Jun. 13, 2014, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/13/people-move-to-places-thatfit-their-politics-and-its-helping-republicans/ (discussing the effect of
“natural gerrymandering” based on a preference to live near those with
similar political ideologies).

21.

See Aaron Blake, The Democrats’ Midterm Turnout Problem—in 6
Charts, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/10/24/the-democrats-midterm-turnout-problemin-6-charts/ (reporting general demographic trends); Philip Bump, How
Obama Misunderstands 2014 Turnout, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/12/29/howobama-misunderstands-2014-turnout/.

22.

Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1935–Present, History,
Art & Archives: U.S. House of Representatives, http://history.
house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/74-Present/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2015) [hereinafter Party Divisions of the House]; Party Division in the
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During the George W. Bush Administration, Republicans controlled at
least one house of Congress until the midterm elections of 2006
delivered control of both houses to Democrats.23
As a practical matter, these structural divisions between the two
branches may yield sharp differences in policy priorities between Congress and the executive branch, and enforcement controversies may be
one important manifestation of such political disagreements. In the
following discussion, I briefly sketch ways in which these dynamics have
played out in recent administrations, concentrating in particular on the
presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.
This sketch is deliberately brief and impressionistic rather than exhaustive and systematic. My chief aim is to provide context for my
normative analysis in Parts II and III by highlighting the degree to
which the politics of nonenforcement are reversed today as compared
to the recent past.
A. President Ronald Reagan

President Reagan assumed office with a perceived mandate to
deregulate.24 Reagan advanced this objective principally by reducing or
eliminating affirmative regulatory burdens. He thus established on his
first full working day in office a Task Force on Regulatory Relief.25
Chaired by Vice President George H.W. Bush, the task force undertook
“a review of existing and proposed regulations to generate a list of those
to be eliminated or scaled back.”26 Within a month, the President had
also issued the landmark Executive Order 12,291, “Federal Regulation,”
which required regulatory agencies to submit proposed regulations for
cost-benefit review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”), a component of the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) within the Executive Office of the President.27 One lasting
legacy of Executive Order 12,291 and subsequent orders regarding
“regulatory review” has been increasingly centralized control over
Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/history/
partydiv.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Party Division in
the Senate].
23.

Party Divisions of the House, supra note 22; Party Division in the Senate,
supra note 22.

24.

See generally James T. Patterson, Restless Giant: The United
States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore 174–77 (2005).

25.

Barry D. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The
Eruption of Presidential Influence 38 (1995).

26.

Reuel Schiller, An Unexpected Antagonist: Courts, Deregulation, and
Conservative Judicial Ideology, 1980–94, in Making Legal History:
Essays in Honor of William E. Nelson 264, 267 (Daniel J.
Hulsebosch & R.B. Bernstein eds., 2013).

27.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
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regulatory policy within the White House.28 At the time, however, a
key objective was to impose the administration’s deregulatory objectives onto an unwieldy bureaucracy suspected of excessive enthusiasm for regulation.29
While affirmative reduction in regulatory burdens thus took center
stage in the Reagan Administration’s deregulatory effort,
nonenforcement also played an important role. As Kate Andrias
reports, although President Reagan “put no formal mechanism of
enforcement coordination into place,” his administration generally
sought budget reductions that limited the enforcement capacity of
disfavored agencies.30 At the same time, his “political appointees in the
various agencies gave life to his deregulatory commitments in part
through the exercise of administrative enforcement discretion.”31 In
some areas, the declines were dramatic: between 1980 and 1982,
citations by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration fell 27
percent, while penalties assessed fell by 78 percent; new EPA cases
under a key environmental statute fell from forty-three in fiscal year
1980 to three in 1982; and EPA’s regional offices forwarded only thirtysix cases to the agency’s central office for enforcement in 1981 after
forwarding 313 in 1980.32 In the area of civil rights, a 1989 report
complained that “during the 1980s federal agencies virtually abandoned
trial and appellate litigation as a tool to enforce most civil rights laws”;
suits by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alone fell 70
percent between 1981 and 1982.33
In at least some instances, declining enforcement reflected deliberate policy. The administration formally abolished the EPA’s Office of
Enforcement and transferred its functions to the agency’s legal office—
a fairly dramatic signal of reduced commitment to adversarial
environmental enforcement.34 OSHA’s leadership deliberately altered
28.

One classic defense of this development is found in Elena Kagan’s article,
Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2277–78 (2001).
For a more recent account, see Kate Andrias, The President’s
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031, 1054–69 (2013).

29.

See Schiller, supra note 26, at 267 (describing Reagan’s actions to deregulate after he assumed office).

30.

Andrias, supra note 28, at 1059.

31.

Id.

32.

Friedman, supra note 25, at 84.

33.

Citizen’s Commission on Civil Rights, One Nation Indivisible:
The Civil Rights Challenge for the 1990s, at 6, 12, 14 (Riginald C.
Govan & William L. Taylor eds., 1989). See generally Farhang, supra note
17, at 173 (“Once in office, Reagan curtailed administrative enforcement
of civil rights by numerous objective measures.”).

34.

Richard W. Waterman, Presidential Influence & the Administrative State 126 (1989).
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the agency’s inspection practices and reduced field officers’ authority
to issue certain citations.35 In the antitrust context, the administration
pursued enforcement practices predicated on its policy view that
“virtually all business activity except horizontal price fixing is good for
the American consumer and good for the economy.”36
The administration and its intellectual allies advanced legal
theories to justify these deregulatory actions. With respect to deregulation itself, administration lawyers developed arguments (many ultimately rejected by the courts) that deregulatory agency actions should
receive reduced judicial scrutiny as compared to affirmative regulatory
actions.37 With respect to nonenforcement, Assistant Attorney General
William Baxter, the controversial head of the Justice Department’s
Antitrust Division, published a law review article in 1982 defending the
administration’s use of prosecutorial discretion to shape antitrust
policy.38 Despite acknowledging that the Take Care Clause “imposes
the duty . . . on the executive branch to enforce the law,”39 Baxter
argued that “the Antitrust Division as an organ of the executive branch
has considerable discretion in the selection of cases to prosecute and in
the exercise of this discretion is not required to prosecute every type of
conduct susceptible to challenge under existing judicial precedents.”40
Baxter also argued that the common-law character of antitrust law
made policy-driven uses of prosecutorial discretion particularly appropriate in that context. “Congress relied upon the interaction of the
judicial and executive branches to ensure the development of a workable and responsive law of competition,” Baxter wrote.41 Accordingly,
the executive branch was “under no duty to prosecute cases involving
conduct that has been found [unlawful] in the past or for which
35.

George C. Eads & Michael Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagan’s
Regulatory Dilemma 196–97 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds.,
1984).

36.

Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 947 (1987). See also William French Smith, Law
and Justice in the Reagan Administration: The Memoirs of an
Attorney General 42–55 (1991) (“[O]ver the four years of the first
term we produced a revolution in the government’s attitude toward
enforcement of the antitrust laws.”).

37.

See Schiller, supra note 26, at 268–69. For critical analysis of these arguments and judicial responses, see Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and
Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1985).

38.

William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and
the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661 (1982).

39.

Id. at 674.

40.

Id. at 681–82.

41.

Id. at 702.
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colorable arguments of illegality can be made unless the prosecution of
these cases will promote the public interest.”42
A year later, then-Judge Antonin Scalia (appointed to the D.C.
Circuit by Reagan in 1982) offered a spirited defense of executive
nonenforcement in a well-known lecture on The Doctrine of Standing
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers.43 Attacking the
notion that courts should “enforce upon the executive branch adherence
to legislative policies that the political process itself would not
enforce,”44 Scalia argued:
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests
are affected, “important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls
of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of
the federal bureaucracy?” Of course it does—and a good thing,
too. Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals or
minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to
get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday’s
herald is today’s bore . . . . The ability to lose or misdirect laws
can be said to be one of the prime engines of social change.45

Then-Professor Frank Easterbrook similarly poked fun at “attacks”
taking the “form” that “some rule is ‘the law,’ it has been enforced as
the law in the past, so how dare today’s law-enforcement officials not
enforce it?”46 Easterbrook argued: “Prosecutorial discretion is as much
part of ‘the law’ as any other rule.”47
For their part, the President’s opponents in Congress and elsewhere
resisted the administration’s nonenforcement practices.48 President
42.

Id.

43.

Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881 (1983).

44.

Id. at 896.

45.

Id. at 897 (quoting Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).

46.

Frank H. Easterbrook, On Not Enforcing the Law, Regulation: AEI J.
on Gov’t & Soc’y 14 (Jan./Feb. 1983).

47.

Id. at 15. Easterbrook nevertheless correctly emphasized the limits of
prosecutorial discretion and the basic obligation of agencies to implement
statutory policies. He argued, “When the Antitrust Division [of the Justice
Department] stops filing prosecutions [in certain cases,] . . . it does not
send its staff away to take knitting lessons. It puts the lawyers to work
on other cases. A conscientious department keeps changing its enforcement decisions until it gets the most benefit it can out of them.” Id.

48.

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 36, at 52–53 (describing media and
congressional opposition to antitrust policies); Kenneth J. Meier,
Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, & Economics 231 (1985) (noting contentious oversight of OSHA); Farhang, supra note 17, at 178–80
(discussing congressional oversight of civil rights enforcement in the 1980s
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Reagan’s environmental enforcement policies produced particularly
acute opposition in Congress. Concerned that the President’s EPA
Administrator was failing to enforce the powerful toxic waste cleanup
provisions in the newly minted Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) of 1980,
House committees held repeated oversight hearings and subpoenaed
enforcement-related documents.49 In 1983, after the administration,
claiming executive privilege, refused to produce subpoenaed materials,
the House of Representatives held the Administrator in contempt.50 In
language that resonates with contemporary debates, a House
committee’s contempt referral asserted:
The power conferred by the Constitution under [the Take Care
Clause] is primarily to empower the President simply to carry out
the laws enacted by Congress. It neither expressly nor impliedly
authorizes the President, or any agency, to withhold documents
essential to evaluating the administration of the laws passed by
Congress which the President is to “faithfully” execute.51

The administration ultimately softened its posture on
environmental enforcement and negotiated a deal to release the
disputed documents.52 Yet Congress remained suspicious of the
administration’s commitment to environmental protection, as reflected
in a series of statutes confining its discretion to evade regulatory
mandates.53 In at least one environmental statute, Congress specifically
required executive enforcement of any violations not pursued by
states.54 President Reagan objected in a signing statement, asserting
that the statute’s suggestion that “some enforcement actions are
and describing the decade as “marked by implacable conflict over civil
rights policy between Congress and the executive branch”).
49.

See generally Jeffrey K. Stine, Natural Resources and Environmental
Policy, in The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and
Its Legacies 233, 241–42 (W. Elliot Brownlee & Hugh Davis Graham
eds., 2003) (describing the controversy and the subsequent committee
investigation).

50.

See Philip Shabecoff, House Charges Head of E.P.A. with Contempt, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1982, at A1.

51.

H.R. Rep. No. 97-968, at 11 (1982).

52.

See Stine, supra note 49, at 242–43; WATERMAN, supra note 34, at 133–37.

53.

See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L.J.
819, 825–27 (1988) (describing congressional effort in the late 1980s to
impose “more effective legislative controls on the EPA”).

54.

Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339 § 102,
100 Stat. 642 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(a)).
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mandatory” was of “questionable validity” because “Congress cannot
bind the Executive in advance and remove all prosecutorial discretion
without infringing on the powers of the Executive.”55
As the Reagan Administration drew to a close, leading
administration lawyers and academic supporters complained about a
“fettered presidency.”56 Amid a litany of asserted congressional excesses, one former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel lamented that “legislation is often proposed, and occasionally
passed, that would strip the president’s discretion to decide not to
prosecute a particular offense.”57
B. President George W. Bush

While President George H.W. Bush appears to have continued (or
in some cases softened) patterns set by President Reagan,58 the next
Republican President, President George W. Bush, arguably pushed
nonenforcement further.59 The familiar Reagan-era tools of budget cuts
and appointment of deregulatory agency heads produced aggregate
declines in enforcement rates and less aggressive enforcement tactics in
many areas.60 The breadth and pervasiveness of these shifts, however,
have prompted some observers to posit that “Bush exercised more
extensive control over enforcement than did many of his predecessors,”
even if “the White House rarely claimed responsibility for [enforcement]
decisions.”61
White House fingerprints were perhaps most visible on key aspects
of environmental enforcement. Taking its cue from Vice President Dick
Cheney’s controversial Energy Task Force, the EPA promulgated
regulations that effectively exempted many power plant renovations

55.

Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1986 (June 19, 1986).

56.

The Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive
Branch (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989).

57.

Theodore B. Olsen, The Impetuous Vortex: Erosion of Presidential Authority, in The Fettered Presidency, supra note 56, at 225, 233.

58.

On President Bush’s approach to regulation and domestic policy generally, see Friedman, supra note 25, at 160–68; Patterson, supra note 24,
at 240; John Robert Greene, The Presidency of George Bush 61–
63 (2000). I omit discussion of President Clinton so as to concentrate on
President Obama’s Republican predecessors and because enforcementrelated controversies appear not to have been a dominant theme of the
Clinton Presidency. See Andrias, supra note 28, at 1059–60.

59.

See Andrias, supra note 28, at 1061–63.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 1061.
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from so-called “new source review” requirements of the Clean Air Act.62
Although these statutory provisions generally require otherwisegrandfathered power plants to comply with stricter pollution controls
following certain renovations, the EPA’s regulations carved out an
extensive safe harbor from this statutory mandate.63 The D.C. Circuit
ultimately invalidated the safe harbor, calling it consistent with the
statutory language “[o]nly in a Humpty Dumpty world.”64 Nevertheless,
the agency continued to exempt such plants from the statute as a
matter of enforcement practice.65
Steep declines were also evident at other key agencies. For example,
the number of warning letters issued by the FDA declined by more
than 50 percent between 2000 and 2005 while the number of seizures of
dangerous products fell by 44 percent.66 The Department of Labor’s
Inspector General faulted the agency for inadequate mine inspections
and insufficient attention to employers with serious workplace safety
issues.67 In both cases, the Inspector General blamed management
inattention as well as resource constraints for the problems.68 Similarly,
the Government Accountability Office found that the Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division followed an “ineffective” complaintprocessing system that included, among other flaws, excessive reliance
62.

See generally Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering
and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source
Review, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1677, 1681–1705 (2007) (providing background on New Source Review); Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong
Enforcement Works Better Than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New
Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1204 (2013)
(describing New Source Review enforcement during the George W. Bush
administration).

63.

See McGarity, supra note 62, at 1243–70; Nash & Revesz, supra note 62,
at 1702–04.

64.

New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

65.

Andrias, supra note 28, at 1063. For my own critical analysis of this
policy, see Price, supra note 10, at 762–63.

66.

Staff of H. Comm. on Gov. Reform, Special Investigations
Division, 109th Cong., Prescription for Harm: The Decline in
FDA Enforcement Activity 11, 13 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter
Prescription for Harm] (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman).

67.

Dep’t of Labor, Office of Inspector General—Office of Audit,
Report No. 02-09-203-10-105, Employers with Reported Fatalities Were Not Always Properly Identified & Inspected Under
OSHA’s Enhanced Enforcement Program (2009); Dep’t of Labor,
Office of Inspector General—Office of Audit, Report No. 0508-001-06-001, Underground Coal Mine Inspection Mandate Not
Fulfilled Due to Resource Limitations and Lack of
Management Emphasis (2007).

68.

Employers with Reported Fatalities, supra note 67, at 3;
Underground Coal Mine Inspection, supra note 67, at 1.
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on noncoercive conciliatory measures against employers in response to
complaints.69
Perhaps most controversially, the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department shifted enforcement priorities in ways that
administration critics viewed as political.70 The Division filed significantly fewer employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,71 with particularly steep declines in cases on
behalf of African Americans.72 The Division also brought fewer votingrights cases under section two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.73
According to critics, “[t]he Division appeared to displace its traditional
concern for the voting rights of African-Americans with a predominant
focus on Hispanic voters through its choice of section 2 litigation and
through its enforcement of the language access provisions of the Voting
Rights Act.”74 At the same time, the Division’s political leadership
repeatedly overruled staff recommendations on other voting-rights
issues, particularly where Republican Party interests appeared to be at
stake.75
As during the Reagan Administration, President Bush’s political
opponents detected such enforcement trends and sought to hold the
administration accountable. For instance, after regaining control of
Congress, Democrats exercised vigorous oversight over Justice Department practices.76 A House committee conducted oversight hearings on
the Department’s civil rights enforcement.77 Even earlier, minority staff
on a House committee issued a scathing report faulting the FDA for

69.

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-458T, Dep’t of Labor: Wage & Hour Division’s Complaint Intake and Investigative Processes Leave Low Wage Workers Vulnerable to
Wage Theft, at i, 9, 19–21, 24–25 (2009).

70.

See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration & Civil Rights: Lessons
Learned, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 77 (2009); Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 211 (2008).

71.

42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012).

72.

Liu, supra note 70, at 80.

73.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012); Liu, supra note 70, at 79.

74.

Liu, supra note 70, at 79 (footnotes omitted).

75.

Id. at 82–86.

76.

See id. at 87–88, n.50.

77.

See, e.g., Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights
Enforcement Within the Department of Justice, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 44 (2007). See also Kennedy, supra note
70, at 234–35.
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abdicating its statutory mission.78 Addressing the administration’s
record of civil rights enforcement, a Democratic subcommittee chairman complained, “If the rule of law is to have any meaning, if the civil
rights laws this Committee produces are to have any value, then we
must be assured that those laws will be enforced without fear, favor, or
political contamination.”79
C. President Barack Obama

Given nonenforcement’s use as a deregulatory tool in previous
administrations, the close political identification of nonenforcement
with President Obama—a President strongly committed to the social
utility of regulation—is surprising, as is congressional Republicans’
insistence on a strong executive enforcement obligation. Yet the Obama
Administration has provoked controversy with nonenforcement policies
in several key areas.
To begin with, in a series of memoranda from the Deputy Attorney
General to the U.S. Attorneys, the Justice Department adopted an
overt policy of giving low priority to prosecution of federal marijuana
offenses where the offender complied with state law.80 Although federal
law criminalizes marijuana possession and distribution, federal officials
have not devoted significant resources to ground-level enforcement of

78.

Prescription for Harm, supra note 66.

79.

Changing Tides, supra note 77, at 2 (prepared statement of Rep. Jerrold
Nadler).

80.

Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys,
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2014),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-wdwa/legacy
/2014/02/14/DAG%20Memo%20-%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Mari
juana%20Related%20Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%2014%20%282%2
9.pdf; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S.
Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013)
[hereinafter 2013 Cole Enforcement Memorandum], available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf;
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys,
Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to
Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use 1–2 (June 29, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dagguidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf; Memorandum from David
W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected U.S. Att’ys, Investigations and
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana 1–2
(Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf. The Department recently
extended the same treatment to Native American tribes. See Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir., Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys,
U.S. Department of Justice, to U.S. Att’ys, Policy Statement Regarding
Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/20
14/12/11/policystatementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountry2.pdf.
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these prohibitions.81 States, however, began liberalizing their own
marijuana prohibitions, and in 2012 Colorado and Washington decriminalized recreational use of the drug.82 While in some sense the new
federal policy simply preserved traditional federal enforcement
priorities in the face of these state law changes, the practical effect of
the Department’s publicly stated policy was to get federal law out of
the way of new state experiments in liberalization.83 The result has been
a remarkable boom in overt marijuana businesses in some areas,
particularly Colorado.84
A second set of controversial policies involved implementation of
the Affordable Care Act. Although the statute set clear effective dates
for key provisions, the Department of Health and Human Services
effectively postponed these deadlines for lengthy periods for two key
sets of statutory requirements: first, the requirement that health
insurance plans meet certain coverage requirements; and second, the
so-called employer mandate, which penalizes employers above a certain
size for failing to provide health insurance for their employees.85 In
support of both policies, the agency claimed organic authority to provide “transition relief” by declining enforcement of statutory restrictions while the law was first taking effect.

81.

See 2013 Cole Enforcement Memorandum, supra note 80, at 2. For figures
on recent enforcement, see Price, supra note 10, at 757 n.368.

82.

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16 (amended 2014); Wash. Initiative Measure
No. 502 (July 8, 2011).

83.

For my own qualified defense of the policy’s legality, see Price, supra note
10, at 757–59.

84.

See Niraj Chokshi, Marijuana Could Deliver More Than $800 Million in
Revenue to Washington and Colorado, GovBeat, WASH. POST (Sept.
26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/
26/marijuana-could-deliver-more-than-800-million-in-revenue-to-washing
ton-and-colorado/.

85.

See Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins.
Oversight, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State Ins. Comm’rs (Nov.
14, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters
/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf (indicating that health
plans “will not be considered to be out of compliance” with statutory
insurance requirements under specified circumstances); Bulletin from
Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Extension of
Transitional Policy Through October 1, 2016 (Mar. 5, 2014), available at
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Downloads/transition-to-compliant-policies-03-06-2015.pdf
(extending
policy to plan years beginning before October 1, 2016); I.R.S. Notice 201345, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116 (July 29, 2013) (providing relief from penalties for
employers who fail to provide insurance as required by statute); Shared
Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg.
8543, 8569 (Feb. 12, 2014) (extending transition relief from penalties for
certain employers).
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Finally, President Obama’s most controversial executive actions
relate to immigration. As a result of decades of failed immigration
enforcement, the United States is home to a substantial population of
undocumented immigrants—individuals who either entered the United
States unlawfully or overstayed visas allowing their entrance. In two
bold policy initiatives, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
exercised its “prosecutorial discretion” to shield substantial components
of this population from removal. DHS announced its first initiative in
2012: the so-called “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (DACA).
DACA addressed some of the most compelling candidates for immigration relief: the so-called “dreamers”—individuals who entered the
United States as young children and have grown up to be law-abiding
Americans.86 In 2014, the Department announced a similar program for
undocumented immigrants who are parents of U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents.87 In both programs, the Department invited immigrants in covered groups to apply for “deferred action,” a form of
immigration relief in which the government promises for a specified
renewable period (three years under these policies) not to seek the
immigrant’s removal from the United States.88 Though technically
revocable at any time, “deferred action” normally amounts in practice
to a temporary guarantee of non-removal. Under immigration
regulations, moreover, it entails eligibility for work authorization,89

86.

Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
for David Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al.,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretio
n-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.

87.

Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., for Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et
al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents
(Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbed
dedFile/57134.

88.

For a general description of deferred action, see Memorandum Opinion
from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. &
the Counsel to the President, The Department of Homeland Security’s
Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in
the United States and to Defer Removal of Others at 12–18 (Nov. 19,
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opin
ions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf
[hereinafter Authority to Prioritize Removal].

89.

Classes of Aliens Authorized to Accept Employment, 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.12(c)(14) (2014).
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notwithstanding general statutory prohibitions on employment of undocumented workers.90
Although the administration and its allies invoked executive precedents to support these policies,91 congressional Republicans have fiercely
attacked their legality. In a report advocating legislation to authorize
congressional suits against the President, the House Committee on
Rules declared:
[T]he President has failed on numerous occasions to fulfill his
duty under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution of the United
States to faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress. He has
ignored certain statutes completely, selectively enforced others,
and bypassed the legislative process to create his own laws by
executive fiat. These unilateral actions have led to a shift in the
balance of power in favor of the presidency, challenging Congress’
ability to effectively represent the American people.92

II. Criteria of Faithful Execution
Recent presidents, then, have used nonenforcement as a policymaking tool with increasing boldness. Presidents Reagan and Bush
helped to normalize policy-driven exercises of enforcement discretion by
dramatically reducing or diverting enforcement efforts with respect to
laws they disfavored. President Obama has not only continued the
trend toward policy-driven nonenforcement but also brought this
executive practice into the open by publicly announcing
nonenforcement policies on high-profile issues and claiming credit for
them to a degree earlier presidents did not. As Professor Andrias
observes, although presidents since Reagan have consistently claimed
ownership and control over regulatory policy, “presidential attention to
agency enforcement efforts has been comparatively informal, episodic,
and opaque.”93 President Obama may thus herald a shift toward more
transparent and centralized control over enforcement decisions.
Powerful structural forces underlie these developments. On the one
hand, increasing partisan division in Congress and the resulting
difficulty of legislative action place pressure on Presidents to address

90.

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2012).

91.

See, e.g., Authority to Prioritize Removal, supra note 88, at 18–20, 23–
24 (approving legality of deferred action program for parents of U.S.
citizens and legal permanent residents based on asserted congressional
acquiescence in past exercise of “categorical” deferred action); I.R.S.
Notice, supra note 85 (invoking past provision of “transition relief” as
authority for temporary suspension of ACA’s employer mandate).

92.

H.R. Rep. No. 113-561, at 2 (2014).

93.

Andrias, supra note 28, at 1069.
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constituent demands through executive action.94 On the other hand, the
accretion of regulatory statutes over time, resulting in “a world thick
with federal statutes,”95 heightens the policy significance of
nonenforcement. During the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
nonenforcement advanced deregulatory goals with respect to social and
economic regulation. The Obama Administration, in contrast, has
applied nonenforcement to weaken harsh immigration and drug
statutes. In both cases, political contestation over the social value of
previously enacted statutes drove executive efforts to weaken those
statutes’ practical effect.
Nonenforcement thus appears likely to remain an important
category of executive action. To the extent that is true, we need criteria
for assessing the fidelity of an administration’s enforcement practices
to underlying statutory policies. If executive officials are duty-bound to
enforce statutory policies but nevertheless must exercise tremendous
discretion in doing so, how may we assess their faithfulness to statutory
policies?
I have elsewhere argued that, although faithful execution is often
more a matter of mindset and degree than any sort of bright-line legal
determination, policies with a strongly categorical and prospective
character should generally be impermissible without specific statutory
authorization.96 If enforcement discretion is fundamentally an authority
to turn a blind eye to some violations so as to concentrate on others—
that is, to set priorities for enforcement without altering the basic policy
of the statute—then policies that amount in practice to a prospective
guarantee of nonenforcement to broad categories of offenders should be
presumptively improper. Even within the outer bounds of legal
permissibility, however, some enforcement policies may be more or less
faithful to underlying statutes.
Without attempting an exhaustive analysis here, I offer in this Part
some reflections on pertinent criteria of faithful execution, with an
emphasis on ways in which enforcement differs from other forms of
executive action. Some pertinent measures of faithful execution are
94.

For an account of political polarization, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) (“American democracy over
the last generation has had one defining attribute: the rise of extreme
partisan polarization.”).

95.

See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 270, 301–03 (2013) (“As much as the modern federal
administrative state depends upon the delegation of regulatory discretion
to make law, it also involves a dramatic upsurge in the federal statutory
presence.”).

96.

See Price, supra note 10, at 677, 754–55, 759–61. That is not to say that
such policies should necessarily be subject to judicial review and
invalidation. For my views on the proper judicial role on enforcement
questions, see Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
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straightforward and obvious: As the Reagan and Bush examples
illustrate, reductions in enforcement intensity and diversion of resources
from core statutory priorities may be important measures of an agency’s
fidelity to legislative mandates. But some other criteria are more
complex. In particular, transparency, clarity, and central direction—
qualities that are often considered virtues in other administrative
contexts—will often be vices with respect to enforcement, at least if the
standard by which executive action is judged is fidelity to statutory
policies.
Consider transparency first. Although it has the virtue of making
an administration’s priorities clear, enforcement transparency will often
be counterproductive: the more public the nonenforcement policy, the
stronger the signal to regulated parties that they may organize their
behavior around the enforcement policy rather than the statute or
regulation.97 Many politically volatile regulatory regimes—ranging from
tax enforcement and workplace safety regulation to environmental and
consumer protection—depend on maintaining the deterrent effect of
statutory prohibitions that the agency can realistically enforce in only
a tiny fraction of cases. The Internal Revenue Service, for instance, can
audit only a small fraction (roughly 1 percent) of the tax returns it
receives.98 Accordingly, although it employs internal criteria to identify
returns for audits, it quite properly keeps those criteria secret—for the
obvious reason that disclosure would enable tax evasion.99 The Justice
Department’s contrary choice to disclose its marijuana enforcement
policy illustrates the same point. Despite the policy’s vague and
noncommittal character, it has nevertheless prompted a remarkable
flourishing of illegal marijuana businesses in Colorado and elsewhere.100
It seems doubtful that entrepreneurs and state officials would have felt
the same legal security had the federal government adopted the same
enforcement priorities but kept them secret. As these examples
illustrate, transparent enforcement policies may provide clarity and
predictability to regulated parties, but precisely by doing so they may
undermine statutory policies to a degree that nonpublic internal
guidance would not.

97.

For this reason, an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act shields
agency documents whose production “would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7) (2012). According to the D.C. Circuit, “the importance of
deterrence explains why the exemption is written in broad and general
terms.” Mayer Brown LLP v. I.R.S., 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

98.

Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 Stan. L. Rev.
241, 258 (2013).

99.

Id.

100. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
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Of course, the worst of all worlds may be a policy that is transparent to regulated parties but not to the public. Some have proposed
greater transparency as a means of preventing such sweetheart
arrangements and ensuring public accountability for agency enforcement choices.101 As a practical matter, executive officials will likely
resist disclosing (or even memorializing) policies whose disclosure would
be politically disadvantageous. But in any event, if non-public assurances are easier for executive officials to provide, they may also be easier
to recant. To the extent publicly announced policies provide a stronger
assurance of nonenforcement to regulated parties, publicly disclosed
policies may thus pose the greater threat to statutory policies.
Furthermore, examples discussed above suggest that initial public
disclosure may not always be necessary to ensure political resistance
and accountability. The Reagan and Bush Administrations’ practices
with respect to the environment, workplace safety, and civil rights were
all evident to congressional critics and interest groups, even without
any public announcement of new priorities.102 And while some of these
policies might have been harder to adopt had they been publicly
announced, political opponents and congressional critics nevertheless
often succeeded in imposing political costs and even in some cases
inducing a change of direction.103 At any rate, on a systemic level, more
transparent nonenforcement risks normalizing a perception that
101. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 28, at 1117 (“[D]isclosure of enforcement
policy decisions, accompanied by explanations rooted in law, would
discipline exercises of presidential enforcement discretion.”); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657, 1690–91 (2004) (advocating agency
“reason-giving” with respect to enforcement decisions in part because
“[w]hen agencies offer open, public-regarding, and otherwise rational
reasons, they reduce opportunities for covert, private-interested, or
otherwise arbitrary ones”).
102. See supra Parts I.A–B.
103. Reagan-era congressional opposition to environmental deregulation was
particularly successful in forcing legal and administrative changes. See
generally WATERMAN, supra note 34, at 133–37 (explaining that although
the Reagan administration successfully accomplished many of its goals
during its first two years by reducing enforcement activity and delegating
authority to the states, a “counterrevolution” forced the administration
to “moderate its environmental policy”). Congress admittedly exercises
more effective oversight during periods of divided government. For
discussion of the importance of divided government to separation of
powers generally and proposals to enhance minority rights as a means of
ensuring more effective oversight, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2312 (2006)
(“The practical distinction between party-divided and party-unified
government rivals in significance, and often dominates, the constitutional
distinction between the branches in predicting and explaining interbranch
political dynamics.”).
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statutory enforcement is optional. Hence, if the goal of transparency is
to enable accountability for inappropriate under-enforcement, then
transparency may erode the very norm it seeks to maintain.
Centralization is a double-edged sword too. Ever since President
Reagan kick-started “presidential administration” by established
centralized regulatory review,104 scholars have debated the virtues of
White House control over regulatory policy.105 While centralized control
promises the benefit of increased political accountability for exercises
of delegated discretion,106 it carries the risk of political manipulation
and reduced reliance on neutral agency expertise.107 Centralized
decision-making with respect to enforcement involves similar potential
benefits. To the extent mismatched statutory mandates and agency
budgets necessitate extensive enforcement discretion, centralized political accountability for how that discretion is exercised seems desirable;
indeed, some degree of centralized accountability may even be constitutionally essential.108 What is more, insofar as different agencies hold
overlapping or conflicting mandates, centralized coordination may be
essential to maintaining coherent executive branch policy.109
But centralized control also carries analogous risks. Insofar as
greater centralization invites greater political pressure on enforcement
practices, centralization might push agencies toward policies less
faithful to underlying statutory mandates. Positing that individual
prosecutorial decisions present the greatest risk of political
manipulation (or even corruption), Professor Andrias thoughtfully
proposes a norm of centralized control over general agency priorities

104. See supra Part I.A.
105. For a small sampling of the literature on this question, see Rena Steinzor,
The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1
Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 210 (2012); Nicholas Bagley & Richard
L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. 1260 (2006); Kagan, supra note 28; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995);
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1082 (1986).
106. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 28, at 2331–39.
107. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 757 (2007).
108. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (upholding the for-cause
removal limitation for federal prosecutor because the Court did “not think
that this limitation as it presently stands sufficiently deprives the President of control over the independent counsel to interfere impermissibly
with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the
laws”).
109. See Andrias, supra note 28, at 1084–90, for discussion of this imperative
of inter-agency enforcement coordination.
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and dispersed control over individual prosecutorial decisions.110 As the
examples addressed above illustrate, however, greater centralization
might invite even wilder swings in enforcement levels in politically
volatile areas of regulation. Left to their own devices, mission-driven
agencies might adopt different priorities from politically-driven
presidents.111 In practice, a shift toward stronger presidential control
might thus mean a shift toward weaker norms of statutory
supremacy.112
A final, related measure of agency fidelity to statutory policies is
the degree of clarity in enforcement practices. To some minds at least,
more rule-like policies are more consistent with rule-of-law values—the
“rule of law as a law of rules,” as Justice Scalia famously put it.113 As
Gillian Metzger has argued, moreover, categorical policies may ensure
tighter centralized control (and thus accountability) by leaving individual officers with less discretion to depart from centrally directed
priorities.114 Yet more categorical policies also depart more starkly from
the policy of the statute. By eliminating risks of enforcement outside
the designated priorities, categorical policies—particularly if they are
publicly announced—may shift the on-the-ground rule of law from the
rule of the statute to the rule of the enforcement policy.115
Accordingly, one important way in which executive agencies
express their subservience to statutory policies is precisely by maintaining some indefiniteness in their enforcement policies—by framing those
policies as priorities rather than guarantees. By doing so, executive
110. Andrias, supra note 28, at 1136–41.
111. Professor Andrias acknowledges that “[i]n theory, agencies with a clear
mission are less likely to deviate from statutory purpose than is a
President facing multiple pressures.” Andrias, supra note 28, at 1098. She
argues, however, that presidential influence is happening anyway, and
“[d]rift is less likely if this role is more public.” Id. Recent examples,
particularly President Obama’s action on immigration, suggest that this
surmise may not always be correct: Ability to claim political credit for
enforcement policies may sometimes encourage more aggressive
nonenforcement policies, particularly in a polarized electoral environment
where motivating core constituencies is central to electoral success.
112. I borrow the term “statutory supremacy” from Eric Biber. See Eric Biber,
The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60
Admin. L. Rev. 1, 5, 24 (2008).
113. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
114. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J.
(forthcoming 2015).
115. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev.
157, 176 (1996) (“it is a relatively elementary legal realist insight that
when there is a single enforcement authority, a decision not to enforce
under stated circumstances is indistinguishable from amending the
underlying ‘rule’ to exempt the affected conduct from prohibition”).
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officials avoid, to the greatest extent possible, either definite prospective assurances of nonenforcement or rule-like categorical distinctions between offenders—two forms of nonenforcement that, as
noted earlier, will often amount to implementing a different policy from
the statute itself.116 Courts police this norm indirectly in the APA
context by insisting that agency policies may qualify as “general
statement[s] of policy,” and thus avoid notice-and-comment procedures
required for promulgation of rules,117 only if they retain a degree of
indefiniteness.118
It is true, as Professor Metzger argues, that the Take Care Clause
also imposes a duty to supervise on the President: as the clause’s
“passive [construction] and the sheer practical impossibility of any other
result” make clear, “the actual execution of the laws will be done by
others,” thus making the duty imposed by the clause one of mandatory
supervisory responsibility.119 Insofar as transparent, categorical policies
impose greater constraint on low-level officials, Metzger argues that this
constitutional duty to supervise may provide a constitutional foundation for them.120 In the enforcement context, however, the duty to
supervise is not freestanding but rather serves a specified purpose—to
ensure faithful execution. The duty to supervise, then, presents once
again the problem of assessing faithful execution. For the reasons noted,
more definite categorical policies (particularly when publicly revealed)
may often be less faithful to underlying statutory mandates.121
Some have also argued that agency policies should seek to minimize
arbitrariness, and from that perspective, too, less definite enforcement
policies may seem less desirable.122 After all, by retaining a degree of
case-by-case decision-making and avoiding any firm commitment,
116. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
118. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(“[A]n agency pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical
matter [and thus subject to notice and comment procedures] if it either
appears on its face to be binding or is applied by the agency in a way that
indicates it is binding.”) (internal citations omitted); United States Tel.
Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that policy
statements using mandatory, definitive language are rules subject to
notice and comment procedures); Alaska v. United States Dep’t of
Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 445–46 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (a “general statement of
policy” must “genuinely leave[] the agency . . . free to exercise discretion”)
(quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945–46 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
119. Metzger, supra note 114 (manuscript at 30–31) (on file with author).
120. Id. (manuscript at 72–73) (on file with author).
121. Cf. id. (manuscript at 73) (on file with author) (acknowledging that “this
does not mean that recognizing the duty [to supervise] requires accepting
all instances of presidential direction and administration”).
122. See Bressman, supra note 101, at 1692–93.
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indefinite enforcement guidelines may invite a degree of randomness
that more definite policies might avoid. Again, however, if the rule of
law is the rule of the statute, then treating all violators identically may
not be the paramount value. On the contrary, although rank favoritism,
corruption, and bias of course have no place in an appropriate
enforcement regime, one violator’s avoidance of sanctions does not
necessarily make the next violator more sympathetic. At any rate, as
compared to more definite policies, framing enforcement priorities as
guidelines rather than rules may often strike an appropriate balance by
assuring consistency and top-down direction without signaling to
regulated parties a fundamental change in the underlying rule of law.
Thus, in addition to overall enforcement intensity and appropriate
selection of priorities, transparency, centralization, and definiteness are
axes along which the fidelity of enforcement policies to statutory mandates may be assessed. All else being equal, clear, transparent, centrally
directed guarantees of nonenforcement may conflict with statutory
policies to a degree that internal, agency-derived, indefinite
enforcement policies do not. Values of transparency, centralization, and
clarity, though virtues in other administrative contexts, are potential
vices here, at least if the overall objective is ensuring executive fidelity
to statutory policies.
But trend lines are running in the opposite direction. As the
historical sketch above illustrates, recent administrations have claimed
authority to shift enforcement in ways that conform to presidential
policy preferences. The current administration has given renewed
impetus to this trend. The central question, then, is what norms the
public should expect or desire. Is greater policy-driven nonenforcement
a positive or negative development? Should we prefer transparent,
definite, centrally directed nonenforcement? Or should we prefer norms
that induce executive officials to enforce laws to the best of their ability
even when they disfavor the policies those laws reflect?

III. Practical Benefits of Strong Enforcement
On some level, these questions have formal answers. Notwithstanding the difficulty of identifying clear outer boundaries of appropriate
enforcement discretion, the formal constitutional structure supports
maintaining a strong norm of executive obligation to implement
statutory policies. The Take Care Clause, by its terms, obligates the
President to ensure faithful implementation of statutory policies.
Likewise, the President’s limited role in lawmaking implies an executive
obligation to carry out enacted laws even if the President disagrees with
them.123 Indeed, the sheer difficulty of deciding upon appropriate
123. See Price, supra note 10, for elaboration of the argument in this
paragraph.
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interbranch norms through more abstract analysis reinforces the value
of resolving the question by reference to the formal constitutional
structure. To be sure, some have questioned the distinctive tendency of
American constitutionalism to divert policy disagreements into battles
over constitutional principle.124 But in principle constitutional analysis
may permit resolution of heated political controversies in a manner that
looks beyond the politics of the moment and thus establishes more
durable legal norms.
Nevertheless, to the extent we stand at a crossroads, it is worth
thinking too about practical benefits and costs. What systemic effects
might weakening norms of executive enforcement obligation have on
interbranch relations? To put the point more starkly, what benefit
might a clear-eyed, politically motivated President, locked in partisan
battle and buffeted by capricious swings in public opinion, derive from
maintaining such a norm? Although my observations on this point are
speculative and provisional, eroding norms of executive enforcement
obligation could carry at least three significant costs.
The first, and most important, is that bold nonenforcement
initiatives by one administration may weaken parallel constraints on
future administrations with different policy objectives. As a general
matter, the constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment
makes lawmaking hard. To become a law, a bill must surmount
multiple hurdles: approval by appropriate congressional committees,
passage by both houses of Congress, and ultimately presidential
approval (or a veto override). In some contexts, to be sure, legislative
bargains between the President and the two houses of Congress might
enable passage of stronger regulation than any one house or the
President would consider optimal.125 But, in general, the multiple veto
gates built into the constitutional process favor inertia.126 What is more,
as Dino Christenson and Douglas Kriner explain in their contribution
to this symposium, super-majoritarian features of the lawmaking
process, such as Senate filibuster rules and the constitutional
requirement of a two-thirds majority for veto overrides, create a

124. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience
(2013); cf. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the
Early Republic, 1789–1815, at 185 (2009) (describing the early
emergence of “the peculiar American tendency to discuss political issues
in constitutional terms—a tendency that had the effect of turning quarrels
over policy into contests over basic principles”).
125. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The
Precedents & Principles We Live By 427–28 (2012) (discussing this
possibility).
126. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441, 1444–49 (2008) (describing multiple
“vetogates” that impede legislation).
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“gridlock interval” in which legislative action is impossible even though
a median voter would favor legal change.127
The upshot of this lawmaking structure is that major legislative
achievements—laws like the Affordable Care Act, the Clean Air Act,
or the 1996 welfare reform128—may be possible in some political moments but not others. Both sides of our divided politics may thus have
an interest in ensuring that their own legislative victories stick. Yet
ensuring that one side’s victories stick requires permitting the other
side’s to stick too. In short, executive branch precedent matters, both
legally and practically.129 Future Presidents can be expected to act with
greater latitude when they can point to analogous actions by their predecessors.
Ironically, although current political alignments mask this reality,
Democrats may have more at stake than Republicans in maintaining
strong norms of statutory enforcement. Admittedly, political opposition
to President Obama’s nonenforcement initiatives makes plain that core
Republican constituencies care about at least some forms of regulation.
But in general, amid our deeply polarized politics, Democrats are the
party more committed in principle to the value of regulation in promoting social change and restraining undue private power. Nonenforcement
is fundamentally a deregulatory power: it is a power to strip force from
enacted legal requirements. As examples described in Part I demonstrate, Republican Presidents with deregulatory agendas have used it
that way. What is more, they have done so in many areas of regulation
(such as environmental protection, workplace safety, antitrust,
consumer protection, and civil rights) that Democrats have
traditionally favored. Many such areas involve practical challenges and
resource constraints similar to those used to justify the current administration’s marijuana and immigration nonenforcement policies. Democrats may thus have reason to worry about what future Republican
presidents might do with precedents this administration has set.
A second potential cost to bolder nonenforcement is that it might
mean ratcheting up still further the current toxic level of interbranch
conflict. To be sure, how precisely current congressional-executive
disagreements over enforcement practice will play out remains to be
127. See generally Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Political
Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
897 (2015).
128. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
129. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (observing
that “the longstanding practice of the government can inform our
determination of what the law is” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)); Authority to Prioritize Removal at 18 (relying in part on past
executive actions and presumed congressional acquiescence to justify
immigration program).
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seen. Characterizing President Obama’s policies as a form of
constitutional self-help, David Pozen has argued that violating general
executive enforcement norms might sometimes be justified as a
proportional countermeasure for congressional violations of legislative
norms (such as conventional limits on filibusters and other obstructive
tactics).130 By reconceptualizing interbranch relationships in terms of
self-help, Professor Pozen suggests, the two branches may arrive at a
stable equilibrium despite formal constitutional violations on both
sides.131 Yet Pozen also concedes the risk of reciprocal escalation
inherent in self-help remedies,132 and the risk seems significant here,
given Congress’s perception of its own actions as legitimate (or at least
constitutional) and the President’s as unconstitutional. Thus, whether
or not Pozen is correct that otherwise unconstitutional actions may
become valid as remedies for another branch’s abuses, broadening use
of policy-driven nonenforcement may carry the risk of encouraging
further bare-knuckle responses from Congress and thus exacerbating—
as well as or instead of correcting or managing—political gridlock.
A final practical consequence to consider is the effect of
nonenforcement on the structure of federal law as a whole. The systemic
effects of enforcement discretion are paradoxical: While prosecutorial
discretion provides a crucial safety valve against rigorous enforcement
of outdated or unrealistic laws, persistent nonenforcement also permits
laws to remain in place that would be politically intolerable if fully
enforced.133 President Ulysses Grant once remarked, “I know no method
to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their
stringent execution.”134 Modern presidents, responsible for executing
laws that cannot possibly be fully enforced with available resources,
normally choose enforcement priorities that accord with public
preferences (or at least the preferences of their constituents). Yet one
cost of doing so may be to relieve pressure on Congress to adjust laws
that accord poorly with current preferences.
More overt and specific nonenforcement policies, such as the current marijuana and immigration initiatives, might implicate the same
troubling dynamics to an even greater degree. To begin with, as a
130. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L.J.
2, 7 (2014).
131. Id. at 8, 70.
132. Id. at 50 (“Self-help can also generate negative spillovers, paradigmatically in the form of escalating cycles of recrimination, retaliation, and
violence.”).
133. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich. L. Rev. 505, 546–49 (2001).
134. Ulysses S. Grant, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1869); see also Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 Colum. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 19–20) (on file with author)
(discussing potential of rigorous enforcement to provoke legal change).
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general matter, weakened expectations of executive enforcement might
reduce incentives for lawmakers to undertake the hard bargains and
difficult votes that are often necessary to enact significant legislation.
Why vote for the bad side of a legislative bargain if a future President
may cancel the good side through nonenforcement? With respect to any
given law, moreover, while executive action may provide a short-term
outlet for political pressures for legal change, precisely by doing so
executive action may weaken pressure on Congress to enact legislative
reforms. Yet executive relief is a fragile achievement: Especially when
it takes forms that do not require notice and comment or other
procedural formalities, it can be undone with the stroke of a future
President’s pen. In contrast, undoing legislative change requires further
legislative change, with all the attendant difficulties of bicameralism
and presentment and multiple veto gates to enable opposition.
Precisely how these dynamics play out with respect to any given
law may well vary with the politics of each particular issue. The politics
surrounding marijuana and immigration, the two most significant
nonenforcement initiatives of the Obama Administration, remain
volatile. It seems doubtful that the public today would support either
rigorous federal marijuana penalties or removal of all the country’s
eleven million undocumented immigrants, though formal statutory
policies call for both those actions.135 For that reason, low-level
marijuana enforcement and removal of law-abiding immigrants have
long been low priorities for federal enforcement. Yet it remains to be
seen whether the administration’s more definite nonenforcement
initiatives in these areas will hinder or hasten more meaningful
legislative change.
With respect to marijuana, as broad political support for medical
use at the state level has emerged, Congress enacted a recent
appropriations rider barring use of Justice Department funds “to
prevent such States from implementing their own State laws that
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical
marijuana.”136 Congress, however, has yet to adopt statutory reforms,
nor has it validated administration policy with respect to recreational

135. See Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S.,
GALLUP (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majoritycontinues-support-pot-legalization.aspx; Mark Murray, NBC/WSJ Poll:
Nearly Half Oppose Executive Action on Immigration, NBC NEWS (Nov.
19, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-reform/nbcwsj-poll-nearly-half-oppose-executive-action-immigration-n251631
(reporting poll finding that “a majority of Americans (57 percent) favoring
a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, and that
increases to 74 percent when respondents are told that such a pathway
requires paying fines and back taxes, as well as passing a security
background check”).
136. Pub. L. No. 113-235, tit. II, § 538 (2015).
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marijuana.137 On immigration, Republicans remain divided over the
appropriate response to the President’s action; but despite strong
popular support for changes to immigration law,138 comprehensive
legislative reform at least seems unlikely in the short term.139 In both
cases, executive action in the long run may help entrench constituencies
favoring change: profitable marijuana businesses now have a vested
interest in advocating reform, and the deferred action programs will
only strengthen the economic integration and community ties of
undocumented immigrants who benefit. At least in the immigration
context, however, executive action has also provoked intense political
opposition to legislative change.
President Reagan’s experience with environmental deregulation
offers a thought-provoking, if imperfect, historical analogy. As one
historian explains, while “legislation passed since the late 1960s had
represented a bipartisan consensus that stressed, on the one hand, ever
greater regulation, and, on the other, increasing conservation,”
President Reagan “sought to move government in a different
direction.”140 Yet the choice to pursue this objective through aggressive
executive action, rather than legislative reform (or even more modest
administrative action), proved counterproductive. After stagnating in
the 1970s, membership in environmental organizations, and the
resulting political pressure on Congress, spiked in response to such
controversial executive actions as the elimination of the EPA’s
enforcement office.141 The president capitulated to demands for more
robust enforcement; environmental concern became a more strongly
partisan issue; and deregulatory environmental legislation, to the extent
137. See Evan Halper, Congress Quietly Ends Federal Government’s Ban on
Medical Marijuana, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 2014, http://www.latimes.com
/nation/la-na-medical-pot-20141216-story.html (“Even as Congress has
shifted ground on medical marijuana, lawmakers remain uneasy about full
legalization.”).
138. See supra note 135.
139. See Molly K. Hooper, GOP Chairman Wants to Move Immigration
Reform Early Next Year, THE HILL (Dec. 10, 2014) http://thehill.com/
video/lawmaker-interviews/226712-gop-chairman-republicans-wants-tomove-immigration-reform-early (describing incoming House Judiciary
Committee Chairman’s plans to “tackle the thorny matter on two fronts:
challenging President Obama’s executive action to grant millions of
undocumented workers temporary legal status and moving bills that
passed in his committee last Congress”); Paul Waldman, Why the GOP
Won’t Pass Real Immigration Reform Anytime Soon, WASH. POST, Dec.
31, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/12
/31/why-gop-wont-pass-real-immigration-reform-anytime-soon/ (“Most
Republicans in Congress don’t really want to do anything on immigration
beyond building more fences.”).
140. Stine, supra note 49, at 233.
141. Waterman, supra note 34, at 134–35.
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it was ever feasible, became impossible.142 One commentator summed
up the lessons: “There is a price to pay for inattention to legislative
change . . . subsequent administrations can more easily reverse policies
pursued through administrative action alone.”143
Current debates over immigration and marijuana may differ from
these Reagan-era controversies insofar as President Obama’s actions,
unlike Reagan’s, align with majority public preferences. It is also
possible that Congress will respond to recent initiatives, as it did to
deregulatory initiatives of the Reagan era, by enacting more specific
enforcement mandates or relying more heavily on private enforcement
to achieve policy objectives.144 Yet President Reagan’s experience at
least illustrates how the short-run benefits of executive action for a
President’s constituents may sometimes come at the long-run cost of
impeding more significant legislative changes. To the extent that is
true, maintaining a strong sense of executive obligation to enforce laws,
whether or not the President agrees with them, may not only be most
consistent with the formal constitutional structure but might also stand
the best chance of giving us a sensible, responsive set of laws in the
long run.

Conclusion
The politics of nonenforcement have shifted in recent decades along
with partisan shifts in control of the White House. This reality should
encourage a search for enforcement norms with some basis beyond the
politics of the moment. Building on previous work analyzing
constitutional principles of executive enforcement discretion, this brief
symposium article has reflected on possible criteria for evaluating
faithful execution and potential practical benefits of maintaining strong
norms of executive enforcement obligation. Our polarized, gridlocked
political system will no doubt continue to place pressure on presidents
to address constituent demands through executive action, including
exercises of nonenforcement. But now that nonenforcement’s potential
for both parties is plain, we may hope that each side considers carefully
the precedents it sets.

142. Id. at 134–37.
143. Stine, supra note 49, at 233–34 (quoting Introduction, in Natural
Resources and the Environment: The Reagan Approach 10 (Paul
R. Portney ed., 1984)).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 52–55 (describing examples);
Farhang, supra note 17, at 192–98, 219–20 (arguing that separation-ofpowers conflicts led to enactment in 1990 and 1991 of measures to
authorize and incentivize private environmental and civil rights enforcement).
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